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NOTES
Right to Jury Trial of Legal Issues in Diversity Suits
INTRODUCTION

The "right" to a jury trial of legal issues' in federal court, where
jurisdiction is based solely on diversity of citizenship, has raised significant problems resulting in a great deal of confusion. Certainly after the
passage of nearly two hundred years, one would think the matter quite
settled. However, case law, especially that which has developed over
the past twenty-five years, indicates the right is hardly absolute. In fact,
determining the basis for the right to jury trial in diversity suits is extremely confusing. Viewing the decisions as reasonably as possible, it
still is difficult to decide whether the right is substantive, procedural, or a
matter of federal policy. If the right is substantive in diversity situations,
problems of applicable law (state or federal) arise. If the matter is
procedural, determining whether and under which legal theory federal
procedure applies becomes a matter of special consequence. But if the
right is based solely on policy determination, a whole host of other
problems are encountered, the most important of which involves ascertaining whether a policy decision made by a federal court is, in effect,
substantive law. If such is the situation, then the principles of case
law in this area, existent for over twenty-five years are being paid mere
lip service by present day courts.
The Erie Test
To understand the problem in its proper perspective, a discussion of
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins' and Guaranty Trust Co. v. York3 is necessary, as these two cases are the foundation for recent decisions involving
the asserted right to jury trial. In the Erie case, the right to jury trial
1. The purpose of this article is to determine how the right to a jury trial of legal issues is
decided in diversity cases. This situation is distinguishable from the problem of conflicting
equitable and legal claims. Often, in diversity cases, the plaintiff will enter a legal claim
and defendant will counterclaim raising an equitable question. In such situations, the judge
must decide which issues should be first decided. No matter how the judge decides, a plea
of collateral estoppel will be raised in litigation of the second claim. The case law in this
area is also confusing and interesting, but is not covered in this note.
Compare Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962), and City of Morgantown v.
Royal Ins. Co., 337 U.S. 254 (1949), and Enelow v. New York Life Ins. Co., 293 U.S. 379
(1935) with Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 137 F.2d (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied,
320 U.S. 777 (1943). For interesting discussions of this rather intricate area of law see 5
MOORE, FEDERAL PRA crIcE 38.35(2),(4) (2d ed. 1951); Note, Right to Jury Trial in
Cases Involving Both Equitable and Legal Issues, 47 CALIF. L. Ry. 760 (1959); Note, The
Right to Non-Jury Trial,74 HARV. L. REV. 1176 (1961).
2. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
3. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
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was not specifically in issue. Instead, the entire body of so-called federal
common law developed from the leading case of Swift v. Tyson4 was
abolished in diversity cases and replaced with the Erie test: in a diversity action, the substantive law applicable shall be that of the state,
while procedural matters shall be controlled by the federal rules.
However workable the Erie test appeared at first glance, confusion
in the federal court system soon resulted and has indeed continued to
the present. First, the Court in its opinion did not expressly state how
subsequent federal courts were to determine whether an issue involved
was substantive or procedural. It was not made clear whether a federal
court was to ascertain the matter in terms of the state law involved as
interpreted by the particular state courts, or if the federal courts were to
use independent techniques of inquiry. Second, regardless of which
system controlled such interpretations, federal or state, it was soon found
that deciding when a matter is "procedural" and when it is "substantive"
is by no means an easy task. Thus, courts disagreed: some thought they
were bound by a state court determination of the issue, while others
insisted that a federal court in a diversity case should decide whether a
state practice is substantive or procedural.5
The Outcome Test
Only seven
tcoutcome"
test,

years passed before a new standard, commonly called the
was adopted in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York.'

The so-called "outcome" test stated that a federal court sitting in
a diversity case was not bound by a strict and sometimes impossible
delineation between substantive and procedural law. As a matter of
practicality, the Court held that the "outcome" of a diversity suit need
only be "substantially the same" as it would be in the state court.7 Viewing the proceedings as a whole, a federal court was to apply state substantive law only if the decision in the federal court would be substantially different than it would be in the state court.
Many writers immediately recognized the speculative nature of the
"outcome" test and serious questions in regard to its validity were
raised.8 Federal courts today, without expressly abolishing the "out4. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
5. See Enelow v. New York Life Ins. Co., 293 U.S. 379 (1935).
6. See note 3 supra. One particularly interesting fact has resulted from the rendering of
this decision. Not one court which has decided a case subsequent to the Guaranty case has
expressed the opinion that it overruled the Erie case. Indeed, what would seem to be a significant change in the federal court system's approach to diversity cases has not been treated
in such a manner. Instead, courts have often cited both cases together, apparently assuming
they are not in conflict. See text infra at 785.
7. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110-12 (1945).
8. E.g., Merrigan, Erie to York to Ragan - A Triple Play on the Federal Rules, 3 VAND L.
REV. 711 (1950); Note, 30 MINN. L. REv. 643 (1946).
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come" test, are reluctant to use it.' But whether these courts have restored the test employed in the Erie case is debatable. When read
literally, some of the more recent decisions indicate a return to the holding in the Erie case. At least the liberal use of words such as "substantive" and "procedural" in opinions would lead to that conclusion."
Nevertheless, the holding of a case must be interpreted in light of the
fact situation involved. Many of the fact situations are quite distinguishable from those in the Erie case,11 and different fact situations often destroy the logic and applicability of this test. Of primary importance is
the fact that fixed principles are not being enunciated by the courts.
These factors make this particular area of law confusing, frustrating, and
oftentimes disheartening.
MODERN DEVELOPMENT

2
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc.'

The first case before the United States Supreme Court which involved
the sole issue of the right to jury trial in a diversity suit embracing legal
issues was Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc.'" The question
presented was whether the judge or jury should resolve the issue of
employer immunity from common-law suits under the South Carolina
workmen's compensation statute, the statute being silent in regard to
who should decide the matter. Because South Carolina courts in the
past had considered the issue as one for the judge's determination, respondent contended that federal courts were bound by the South Carolina
9. Cf., Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956); Ragan v. Merchants
Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949); Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S.
535 (1949); Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949); Angel v.
Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947). These cases show a gradual shift away from the "outcome"
test. For example, the Court in the Angel case declared that in diversity actions, a federal
court is "only another court of the state." This seems quite contrary to the ruling in the
Gnaranty case. When compared with decisions involving a federal policy decision, as mentioned in this note, it is apparent that conflict of a substantial nature exists. See text infra
at 781.
10. This conclusion, it is submitted, is correct. After all, the Erie case is the decision that
initiated the distinction between substantive and procedural law. Thus, courts faced with diversity situations which decide a matter in terms of substantive and procedural law must
necessarily be thinking of the Erie test. Quaere, what happens to the Erie test when federal
policy is involved? Which is stronger, the test or the policy?
11. As mentioned previously, the Erie case involved determining whether Pennsylvania law
(the situs of the cause of action) controlled, or if federal courts could establish their own
common law. But when the question is one not clearly procedural or substantive, in effect
"quasi substantive" or "quasi procedural," then the Erie test is almost impossible to apply.
That is, if a right is considered "substantive" by state statutes, case law, and the like, are
federal courts to question such determinations? See generally LOUISELL & HAZARD, PLEADING AND PROCEDURE 1272-76 (1962).
12. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
13. Ibid.
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decisions and petitioner, therefore, was not entitled to a jury trial in
federal court.
The Court disagreed with respondent's argument. It concluded that
the statute's wording, when read in conjunction with the South Carolina
opinions, did not indicate the necessary "special relationship" between
the "form and mode" of trial and the substantive law of the act.'4 It
was held that even though the cases did not expressly state whether the
matter was substantive or procedural, in South Carolina it was clearly
procedural. Thus, apparently employing the Erie test, the Court decided that petitioner was entitled to a jury trial in federal court.
Byrd v. Blue Ridge: The Erie Test and Outcome Tests
The Court, however, went further and discussed the case in terms of
the "outcome" test. It reasoned that the right to jury trial in diversity
cases was a matter of federal policy under the "outcome" test. Because
the seventh amendment influenced this policy, the Court concluded that
jury trials were to be favored in federal courts. This latter portion of the
Court's opinion was literally a re-analysis of the Byrd case, after the issue
had seemingly been resolved under the Erie test. 5 And because the
Court in the Byrd case analyzed the matter from two viewpoints, subsequent cases have conflicted.
One of the most interesting points raised in the opinion was the
meaning of magic words such as "special relationship." Indeed, what
is the requisite "special relationship" between the "form and mode" of
trial and the substantive law which would make the right or non-right
to jury trial a state's substantive law? Apparently, several factors exist
which could temper the necessary relationship. First, a state law could
exist because it appeared by virtue of a provision in the state constitution. Second, a state statute could expressly provide the rule of law.
Third, the rule of law could exist because of the state's case law. Fourth,
a combination of the foregoing factors could establish the rule.
In the Byrd case, the state statute was silent, as was the South Carolina Constitution. Only case law had decided the matter. Obviously,
the Court found this insufficient to meet the requisites. But how far
does this rule carry? Does it mean all the ingredients (state constitution, statutes, and case law) would have to expressly provide for the mat14. Several other interesting points are raised by the Byrd decision. First, assuming that
the Erie test is still the law of the land, why was it necessary for the Court to discuss the
Guaranty case? Conversely, if the Erie test is not the law of the land, but instead Guaranty
controls, why not admit this and decide only in terms of the "outcome" test? Second, assuming the "outcome" test is the prevailing law, why must the court rely on a prevailing federal
policy to buttress its decision? Is not the substantial effect of state law on the case the purport
of the "outcome" test, not whether the decision may be contrary to federal policy? Third,
why use any test at all if policy is to be the determinant factor?
15. 356 U.S. 525, 528 (1958).
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ter? Would a statute be sufficient? Or would the Byrd case result be
the same regardless of how many sources of state law provided that a
certain matter, such as a right or non-right to jury trial, was substantive?
It is submitted that the Byrd test leaves little room for leeway; that, in
effect, the Byrd decision has eliminated state consideration of the nature
of the right to jury trial. 6
RECENT CASES CITING BYRD v.

BLUE RIDGE

The significance of the decision in the Byrd case arises because of
the manner in which courts have cited it as authority for the adjudication
of an asserted right to jury trial. Also, cases exist which extend this
principle to other situations. Indeed, recent decisions have cited the
Byrd case for at least five propositions which, generally speaking, are
not in harmony with each other.'
Byrd v. Blue Ridge and the Seventh Amendment
8
Wfirtz v. District 21, Bhd. of Painters'
First, the Byrd case has been relied on for the proposition that the
right to jury trial in federal court is derived through the operation of
the seventh amendment, whether jurisdiction is based upon diversity of
citizenship or arises out of a federal statute.
A good illustration of this situation is the Wirtz case. The action
was brought in federal district court, but jurisdiction was based on a
federal statute, not on diversity of citizenship.'" According to previous
case law, none of the problems involved in the Erie, Guaranty, and Byrd
cases were similar to the Wirtz fact situation. Therefore, any application of the three major cases to the Wirtz situation would be unwarranted. Nevertheless, the court did apply the Byrd case. Immediately
raised is the question of how encompassing is the scope of a federal policy
decision.
The statute in the Wirtz case did not expressly provide for the right
16. See, e.g., Schaub v. Calder Van & Storage Co., 308 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1962); Anderson
v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 209 F. Supp. 921 (M.D. Ga. 1962); Girardi v. Pennsylvania
Power & Light Co., 174 F. Supp. 813 (E.D. Pa. 1959). Each of these cases involved interpretations of state statutes by state case law. The question raised was whether federal courts
were bound by such determinations in diversity cases. Each court cited the Byrd decision,
used the magic words "special relationship," found none existing, and decided each case in
terms of its own concept of federal law.
17. The five propositions are derived from federal courts of appeals and one district court.
The last section of the note discusses recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
18. 211 F. Supp. 253 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
19. The cause of action in the Wirtz case was based on a federal statute which gives both the
federal government and labor unions the right to bring an action in federal district court for
unfair practices. The statute involved was the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 402(b) (1959).
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to jury trial. The court was forced to interpret the situation in terms
of other guidelines. The reasoning employed resulted in an interpretation of the right to jury trial in terms of previous federal case law and
the United States Constitution. The court stated that since the cause of
action involved in the Wirtz case was not contemplated by the framers
of the Constitution, the seventh amendment guarantee did not prevail.
This kind of reasoning often appears in opinions where no case law
exists, and a constitution alone provides no solution. Petitioner was
thus denied his right to jury trial because no precedent existed.
The unusual thing about the Wirtz case is the fact that the Byrd
decision was relied upon in reaching a conclusion. The lWirtz case was
ultimately disposed of on other grounds, but the unique and summary
manner in which the Byrd case was cited shows that the court misunderstood the holding of the decision. Indeed, to cite a case which held that
a party was entitled to a jury trial, as the court did in the Wirtz case,
and then to decide that the party is not entitled to a jury trial without
relying upon any criteria is truly disturbing.
It must be remembered that in the Wirtz case, jurisdiction was
grounded entirely on a federal statute. Obviously, when a federal statute
is involved, the Constitution is readily available as a source of authority.
That is, the seventh amendment, if applicable according to case law
and the Constitution, applies directly. However, a diversity situation
presents a different problem because state law, which may be contrary
to federal law, is involved.
In fact, the opinion of the Byrd case was quite explicit in explaining
that the decision to allow a jury trial in a diversity case was one of policy
under the influence of the seventh amendment. This conclusion was not
enunciated until it had first been determined that the judicial disposition
of employer immunity in South Carolina was merely a "form and mode"
of trial, not having the effect of substantive law. Diversity actions were
distinguished from those based on federal statutes.2" It is clear that the
Byrd case did not intend to apply the seventh amendment guarantee to
diversity cases. Yet the court in the Wirtz opinion cited the Byrd case
for that proposition.
Byrd v. Blue Ridge: Right to Jury Trial is Procedural
Rand v. Underwriters at Lloyd's2
Second, it has been stated that the decision in the Byrd case stands
for the proposition that the right to jury trial in diversity suits is wholly
20. 356 U.S. at 530. Obviously, the Court in the Byrd case was quite aware of this important
distinction. Nevertheless, subsequent courts have taken this opinion and have truly destroyed
its intent. See text infra at 783.
21. 295 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1961).
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procedural, whether or not state statutes, case law, or constitutions are
involved. Concluding that the right to jury trial is procedural is presumably based on federal policy, but grounded on an interpretation of
the Byrd case in terms of the Erie test.
Rand v. Underwriters at Lloyd's,2 2 a diversity suit, involved the
adjudication of two consolidated insurance claims. One of the questions
raised on appeal was whether the judge or jury should decide the issue of
adequate notice to the insurer. Under New York case law, previous decisions had held the matter was one for the judge to decide; if federal
law were to control, the issue presumably would be tried by a jury. The
court analyzed the various New York opinions and, relying upon the
Byrd opinion, concluded that the issue was dearly one of procedure.
Thus, petitioner was entitled to a jury trial of the issue involved.
The Rand case raises several significant questions. First, in relation
to the Rand decision itself, the court did not give any logical reason to
support its conclusion that the right to jury trial is procedural. This is
quite disheartening in light of the fact that the decision was based on
an application of the Erie test. Second, with regard to the Byrd case,
the court only cited the portion of that case which spoke in terms of the
Erie test, but then justified a trial by jury based upon the strong federal
policy argument used by the Court in the Byrd case in connection with
its analysis of the "outcome" test. Thus, the Rand case also presents
the question raised previously: Was it necessary for the Court in the
Byrd case to analyze its fact situation in terms of the "outcome" test?
For if the court in the Rand decision could find a federal policy favoring
a right to jury trial based solely on Erie R.R. v. Tompkins," then either
the decision in the Rand case is wrong, or federal policy is stronger than
either the Erie or "outcome" tests. It is submitted that the Rand case
indicates the federal policy prevails regardless of whether the Erie test
or "outcome" test is employed 4
Finally, the Wirtz and Rand cases are incompatible because the
former involved a diversity situation, while in the latter, jurisdiction was
based on a federal statute. In the Rand case, once the asserted right to
22. Ibid.
23. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
24. Another point of concern in the Rand case is the fact that no state statute was involved.
In Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc. the magic words "special relationship,"
"form and mode of trial" and the like were used to interpret a state statute in connection with
state court opinions. Thus, the use of the special words in the Byrd decision really discussed
the relationship of the state statute to the court opinions. The court in Rand v. Underwriters
at Lloyd's, however, embraced the words to find a relationship between the asserted right to
jury trial and the state court decision. Perhaps the distinction is academic because the result
reached in both cases was the same. On the other hand, to cite Byrd v. Blue Ridge and its use
of words, and apply them to a distinguishable situation can only lead to confusion in the future.
Thus, Rand v. Underwriters at Lloyd's is an example of what can occur when a court indiscriminately adopts catchy words and phrases of a previous decision.
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a jury trial of the issue was found to be procedural, the jury trial could
be justified in terms of federal policy.
The court in the Wirtz case, on the other hand, did not have to first
decide whether the right was substantive or procedural because of the
basis of jurisdiction. Federal law controlled the entire proceedings, and
the court could have gone directly to the Constitution to justify its conclusion, instead of incorrectly relying on the Byrd case. There is a significant difference between the policy decision in the Byrd opinion and
a decision based on a federal statute. The former must first consider
state law on the subject while the latter does not even concern state law.
Extension of Byrd v. Blue Ridge
Safeway Stores v. Fannan5
Third, the Byrd case has been extended beyond the issue of right to
a jury trial of legal issues in a diversity case. It has been applied to the
question of which law, state or federal, controls the sufficiency of evidence for the jury's consideration.
In the Safeway case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals analogized
the holding in the Byrd case to the situation in which a party must
present evidence sufficient for the court to turn the case over to the
jury. Prior to the Erie, Guaranty,and Byrd cases, it was held that a salient
distinction existed between proving the elements of a cause of action and
the adequacy or weight of the evidence. 6 Courts sitting in diversity
cases decided that under the Erie test the sufficiency of evidence presented
was a procedural matter and, therefore, was controlled by federal law. 7
The same courts found the elements of a cause of action were governed
by state substantive law.
The court in the Safeway case followed this general rule, but relied
on the Byrd opinion to justify its decision. Signficantly, the court recognized that the Byrd case involved a different factual and procedural situation, yet it was held that the Byrd decision "reached the same result."2 8 Assuming that the conclusion in the Safeway case was valid, it is difficult to
understand why the Byrd decision was cited at all. Certainly there existed extensive authority more directly in point.29 Furthermore, to say
that the Byrd case reached the same result, even though the Byrd and
Safeway cases dealt with different factual and procedural situations, is
completely disarming.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

308 F.2d 94 (9th Cir. 1962).
See 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 5 38.10 (2d ed. 1951) and cases cited therein.
Ibid.
Safeway Stores Co. v. Fannan, 308 F.2d 94, 97 (9th Cir. 1962).
MooRE, op. cit. supra note 26.
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To suggest the court in the Safeway case was justified in citing the
Byrd case would involve an extension of the federal policy decision portion of the Byrd opinion to situations not manifested in that opinion. If
federal policy supposedly embraces many facets, of which the right to
jury trial and sufficiency of evidence are only parts, then the "hidden"
reasoning in the Safeway case is valid. But even a most thorough reading of that decision shows no significant policy argument, especially
when compared with the policy argument of the Court in the Byrd decision. It is possible that both cases may be cited for the same proposition; that the sufficiency of evidence in diversity cases is a matter of
federal policy. This would be a regrettable and unnecessary result.
Extension of the Influence of Strong FederalPolicy

-

0
Kern v.Hettinger."

Fourth, ithas been held that the Byrd case stands for the proposition
that a federal court should determine and control the scope of its own
judgment in diversity cases. This conclusion has been reached without
relying upon either the Erie test or the "outcome" test.
In Kern v.Hettinger,3 a diversity suit for libel and slander, the court
was faced with the issue of state or federal law governing the dismissal
of a case. Citing the Byrd decision, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that federal courts should have control over their own trials. Because the case was brought in federal court, the court determined that
the strong federal policy evinced in the Byrd decision applied and, therefore, federal law controlled. Essentially, it was said that to hold otherwise would result in the control of diversity suits by state courts.
The significant point of the Kern case is the fact that it expressly
denied the applicability of the test employed in the Erie case and did
not mention the "outcome" test."2 This is one of the few decisions in
which a federal policy decision in a diversity suit is not so grounded. The
federal policy, is thus seen in full bloom and evidence of its strength is
great. Still, the following question is raised: Is federal policy in diversity cases so strong that there are no limits upon it? If justification is
unnecessary under the criteria established in either the Erie, Guaranty, or
Byrd cases, is it reasonable to assume a return to the doctrine of Swift v.
Tyson3 3 looms in the near future?
Admittedly, the dismissal of a diversity case and its extraterritorial
effect are dearly procedural matters under the Erie test and, undoubt30.
31.
32.
33.

303 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1962).
Ibid.
Kern v. Hettinger, 303 F.2d 333, 340 (2d Cir. 1962).
41 U.S. (16 Per.) 1 (1842).
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edly, state law would not be applied under the "outcome" test. Nevertheless, does such a policy decision relate to the right or non-right to
jury trial in diversity cases? On the basis of the Kern decision, can a
federal court resolve the issue of jury trial solely on federal policy, without using either the Erie test or the "outcome" test? If this is the intention of the court in the Kern case, it is in conflict with the Byrd decision
because the Court in the Byrd case expressly established standards (though
admittedly muddled) under which the right to jury trial could be determined. In that case, it was first necessary to determine the right (in
terms of either the Erie or Guaranty tests), and then apply federal policy
if the right was under federal law. 4 The court in the Kern case "jumps"
this intermediate stage of determination and decides the issue on the basis
of policy alone.
Confusion: Conflict in Circuit Courts
Dill v. Scuka

-

35

Fifth, a single decision has held that the effect of the Byrd case has
precipitated a conflict in the federal courts of appeals which should be
resolved.
Dill v. Scuka 6 was a malpractice action in which jurisdiction was
based on diversity of citizenship. A major issue raised on appeal to the
court of appeals was whether the federal court should follow state law
when considering the sufficiency of evidence, a question similar to the
one presented in Safeway Stores Co. v. FannanY"Petitioner relied on
the Erie and Byrd cases for the contention that the federal rules should
apply. The court, however, recognized that the Byrd opinion did not
expressly rule on that issue and had created a conflict in the circuits.
The court avoided deciding whether federal or state law applied by
holding that the rules of evidence were the same in this situation. This
hesitant approach differs substantially from the strong policy argument
by the court in the Kern case. Thus, at least in these two cases, it would
seem that a significant disagreement exists. In summary, it can be said
that the Byrd case has caused many new problems in the area of diversity
cases, and that Dill v. Scuka 38 is the only case reported in which the
opinion recognizes the conflict created.
34. See note
35. 279 F.2d
36. ibid.
37. 308 F.2d
38. 279 F.2d

14 supra.
145 (3d Cir. 1960).
94 (9th Cir. 1962).
145 (3d Cir. 1960).
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RECENT UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
CITATIONS

That the decision in the Byrd case has created a conflict in the circuit
courts is apparent, if only based upon the cases commented on in this
artide. Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court, in two recent decisions,"m which necessarily involved the opinion in the Byrd case, ignored
the conflict in the federal courts of appeals.
40
Atlantic & Gulf Coast Stevedores v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd.

The Atlantic & Gulf Coast Stevedores case was before the Court in
late 1962. There, it was stated that the right to jury trial in diversity
jurisdiction cases is guaranteed by the seventh amendment. In reaching its conclusion, the Court relied heavily upon the decisions in Byrd and
another case, Dice v. Akron C. & Y. Ry.41 To understand the Atlantic
case and its possible effect upon future cases, a discussion of the Dice case
is first necessary.
Dice v. Akron C. & Y. Ry 2 was an appeal to the Supreme Court
under the Federal Employer's Liability Act.4" The unique provisions of
this statute state that actions alleging employer liability can be initially
brought in the proper state court or in the federal district court, with
ultimate appellate jurisdiction resting in the federal court system. At
the outset, it is evident that a possibility of conflict between federal and
state practices would exist. In the Dice case, the specific issue was
whether Ohio or federal law would control the question of a fraudulently
obtained release. In Ohio, that question is decided by the judge, while
federal courts would obviously favor a jury trial determination because
of the strong federal policy.
A previous F.E.L.A. case had held that a five-sixths jury verdict
based on state law was permissible in an F.E.L.A. decision. 44 Respondent attempted to analogize these decisions to his own case, arguing that
since the court had permitted a five-sixths verdict based on state law,
then the jury trial could be denied completely if state practice so provided.
39.
Lines
40.
41.

Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221 (1963); Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman
Ltd., 369 U.S. 355 (1962).
369 U.S. 355 (1962).
342 U.S. 359 (1951).

42. Ibid.
43. 45 U.S.C. § 51 35 Star. 65, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1952).
44. Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916). The Bombolis case
also presented the question of right to jury trial, but in a manner distinguishable from the
subject of this article because a federal statute existed upon which jurisdiction was based.
Nevertheless, the idea of a federal policy controlling the right to a jury trial in diversity cases
has travelled a long road since 1916. In Bombolis, a five-sixth jury verdict was allowed
to stand, despite the existence of the seventh amendment. Quaere, would the result be the
same today in light of the Byrd case? Obviously it would not.

WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[VoL 14:773

This argument failed. The Court in the Dice case decided that because
of the federal statute's wording, the seventh amendment controlled and
petitioner was entitled to a jury trial and a unanimous verdict.
Resultant Muddle
The Atlantic case, however, did not involve a federal statute, but was
an action brought by a longshoreman for injuries purportedly sustained
in the course of employment. Although plaintiff, as a longshoreman,
had available to him several federal statutes on which the action could
have been grounded, jurisdiction was based solely on diversity of citizenship.45 The primary question raised on appeal was whether plaintiff had
a right to a jury trial of the issues. The Court, combining the holdings
of the Byrd and Dice cases, held that plaintiff's right was guaranteed by
the seventh amendment.
By citing these two cases for the same proposition, however, the Court
truly confuses the matter. The Byrd and Dice cases basically involved
different questions. The Byrd case was concerned with a state statute,
interpreting the relation of the statute to the state court opinions and
diversity jurisdiction. The Dice case, however, dealt with a federal statute and its interpretation in relation to the United States Constitution.
To say that these two cases when cited together justify or guarantee a
party's right to jury trial in a diversity suit is to completely bastardize the
holdings of both cases.
Simler v. Conners4"
Citing the Byrd and Dice cases together presents the possibility of future conflict in which either case can be relied on by a court for the conclusion reached in the Atlantic case. This undesirable result has occurred
in the recent holding of Simler v. Conners.47 There, the United States
Supreme Court, faced with a long history of Oklahoma court decisions
favoring a judge determination of the issues presented, boldly stated that
the right to a jury trial in diversity suits is guaranteed by the Constitution. The Byrd case, but not the Dice decision, was relied on for such a
conclusion. Although the Court in the Byrd case expressly stated that its
45. The Court mentioned several available alternative remedies. Atlantic & Gulf Coast
First, as a longshoreman,
Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, 359 (1962).
petitioner could have sued on the stevedoring contract, either in admiralty or federal civil
court under 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1927).
Second, the petitioner could have instituted proceedings in federal civil court under the provisions of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1920).
Third, the cause of action could have been brought in admiralty court. See American Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446 (1947).
46. 372 U.S. 221 (1963).
47. Ibid.
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holding was a policy decision under the influence, not the command of
the seventh amendment, it is now cited for guaranteeing the right.
CONCLUSION

Ostensibly, both the Erie and "outcome" tests are still the law of the
land because neither have been expressly overruled. True, the federal
courts take much time delineating substantive and procedural matters in
diversity cases, or reasoning that the outcome of a diversity case would
be no different than that in a state court. But do these two tests have
any real meaning in light of the Byrd, Atlantic, and Simler cases?, Regarding an asserted right to a jury trial of legal issues in a diversity suit,
the answer seems to be: apparently not. The use of the words "guaranteed by the seventh amendment," employed in connection with the often
used phrase "this is a federal policy decision," is indicative of an express
denial of both tests. Indeed, why should a federal court in the future
feel bound to apply the Erie or "outcome" tests when faced with the
strong federal policy (once influencing) now guaranteeing the right to
a jury trial in a diversity case? For if the United States Supreme Court
thinks federal policy is more important than applying the tests of the
past, then certainly the lower federal courts should not feel obligated
either.
But the problem involves more than an asserted right to jury trial.
Examples of expanding the meaning and strength of federal policy to
other quasi substantive or quasi procedural situations has occurred in
cases subsequent to the Byrd decision. And with the added impact of the
Atlantic and Simler cases it can be expected to continue expanding. Perhaps in the future the Court will finally overrule the Erie and "oitcome"
tests and relative peace and order will be restored, except for a multitude
of comment by law professors, lawyers, and law students. At present,
however, it must be submitted that federal policy decisions in diversity
cases represent, in effect, federal substantive law, which suggests a return
to Swift v.Tyson.48
EDWARD KANCLER
48.

41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).

